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I. INTRODUCTION
Scientifically complex cases challenge the expertise of fed-
eral trial judges.' Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court
has held that federal trial judges must take an active role in deter-
mining the admissibility of scientific evidence. 2 The Court in Dau-
bert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. expressed its view that
the adversary system is capable of handling most scientific issues,3
and noted that trial judges may seek the help of third-party ex-
perts.4 Thus, the federal trial judge confronted with a scientifically
complex case may rely on the adversaries or may seek help from a
third-party expert. When faced with this choice, judges usually rely
on the adversaries. 5 Some commentators lament this choice. 6 They
cite systematic flaws within the adversary system and argue that
judges should rely on third-party experts more frequently.7 To com-
bat judicial reluctance, influential observers including Justice
1. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147-48 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting
that judges must make "subtle and sophisticated determinations about scientific methodology ...
[even though] judges are not scientists and do not have the scientific training that can facilitate
the making of such decisions"); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596-97
(1993) (distinguishing broad and wide ranging scientific analyses from quick and final legal
analyses); id. at 599 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that
scientific knowledge, scientific methods, scientific validity, and peer review are not within judges'
expertise).
2. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 597 (requiring federal trial judges to function as "gate.
keepers" to scientific evidence); see also Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. willging, Accepting Daubert's
Invitation- Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43
EMORY L.J. 995, 996 n.5 (1994) (citing articles discussing the rigidity of the Daubert admissibil-
ity standard).
3. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
4. Id. at 595 (citing FED. R. EVID. 706).
5. See Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 1015-19 (discussing the reasons why judges do not
appoint third-party experts).
6. E.g., Ellen E. Deason, Court Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets
Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, 61 & n.3 (1998) (citing commentators who have argued in
favor of more liberal use of court-appointed experts); Samuel H. Jackson, Technical Advisors
Deserve Equal Billing with Court Appointed Experts in Novel and Complex Scientific Cases: Does
the Federal Judicial Center Agree?, 28 ENVTL. L. 431, 432-34 (1998) (observing some difficulties
lay fact-finders may have with complex scientific issues).
7. 'E.g., Deason, supra note 6, at 61 & n.3; Jackson, supra note 6, at 432-34.
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Breyer have called for greater "cooperative efforts" between scien-
tists and judges.8 The Court Appointed Scientific Experts ("CASE")
demonstration project is such an effort.9 CASE facilitates appoint-
ment of third-party experts by identifying qualified and willing sci-
entists for judges who wish to appoint a third-party expert.10
The conclusion that judges should seek help from people
with more knowledge about the subject at hand makes common
sense: If you do not know, ask somebody who does. Recourse to
third-party experts, however, creates its own problems. Article III
vests the federal judicial power in judges who are appointed to
serve life terms and whose compensation cannot be lowered." If
third-party experts exercise too much judicial power, judges abdi-
cate their constitutional role, and Article III is violated.1 2 Thus, the
Constitution limits judges' ability to delegate authority to non-
Article III actors.
Trial judges are also reluctant to assume power traditionally
reserved to the parties. The federal courts operate under the adver-
sary system.'3 In the adversary system, the parties are responsible
for educating the judge regarding the law and the facts.1 4 This sys-
tem promotes personal autonomy, the search for the truth, and ju-
dicial impartiality. 5
Notwithstanding the issues raised by the appointment of
third-party experts, trial judges have inherent power to appoint
outside experts, and the federal rules explicitly define two applica-
tions of this power. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 53
8. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 150 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting
that judges and scientists should cooperate to solve complex and technical problems that face the
modern legal system); HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, 105TH CONG., UNLOCKING OUR FrURE.
TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY (Comm. Print 1998) [hereinafter, UNLOCKNG] (stat-
ing that "Justice Breyer ha[s] specifically endorsed... [e]fforts designed to identify highly quali-
fied and impartial scientific experts to provide advice to the courts for scientific and technical
decisions"), available at http://wwv.house.gov/sciencescience-policy-reporLhtm.
9. Deborah Runkle, Court-Appointed Scientific Erpert&" A Demonstration Project of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, BLAST, Jan. 2000, available at
http:lwww.abanetorg/scitecheblast/janOO/2janOO.html#CASE.
10. Id.
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 CThe judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
12. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957); Reilly v. United States, 863
F.2d 149, 157-58 (1st Cir. 1988); see also discussion infra Part ILB.
13. See generally FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 1.2-1.3 (4th ed. 1992).
14. Id. § 1.2.
15. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial
Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 11-19 (1978).
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allows the court to appoint special masters, 16 and Federal Rule of
Evidence ("FRE") 706 allows the court to appoint experts who can
testify at trial.17 Independent of these rules, the judge's inherent
power also justifies technical advisor appointments. 18 Technical ad-
visors are non-testifying experts who help the judge understand
complicated technical issues.19 Even though judges generally have
the power to appoint outside experts, they normally defer to the
adversarial process. 20
Technical advisor appointments are particularly rare. 21 Two
factors most likely control judicial use of technical advisors: defer-
ence to the adversary system and the burden of finding a suitable
technical advisor.22 In a survey of federal judges, two researchers
found that trial judges highly esteem the adversary system, 23 and
this respect partially accounts for the low incidence of technical ad-
visor appointments.2 4 The administrative burden of identifying pro-
spective qualified technical advisors probably also deters judges
from appointing technical advisors.2 5 Some judges have relied on
personal or professional contacts to identify potential technical ad-
visors.26 For judges without these contacts, the selection process is
more cumbersome. 27
The CASE project is calculated to decrease traditional judi-
cial deference to the adversary system and to lessen the adminis-
trative burden associated with finding a third-party expert.28 The
project endorses technical advisors generally and provides inter-
ested judges with a specific list of qualified and willing experts.2 9
Thus, judges who are concerned about the ill-effects of consulting
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a); see Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-313 (1920) (acknowledg.
ing the inherent power of trial courts to appoint special masters).
17. FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
18. Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 155-56 (1st Cir. 1988) (distinguishing a testifying
expert appointed under FRE 706 from a technical advisor appointed under the trial court's in.
herent power).
19. Id. at 157-58.
20. Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 997, 1018-19.
21. See id. at 1002-03 (noting few cases deal with technical advisor appointments).
22. See infra notes 226-39 and accompanying text.
23. Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 1018-19.
24. Id.
25. Cf., e.g., Reilly v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 150, 152-53 (D.R.I. 1988) (recounting the
steps a judge took to find a technical advisor, including phone calls to three experts before find.
ing a suitable technical advisor).
26. See infra notes 234-43, 264-67 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 234-43, 264-67 and accompanying text.
28. See Runkle, supra note 9.
29. See id. (describing the purpose of the CASE project).
55O
JUDGES COOPERATING WITH SCIENTISTS
an outside expert are assured that the practice is consistent with
good judging, and judges who do not know any experts simply get a
list and call the expert of their choosing.30 Justice Breyer's en-
dorsement of third-party experts has encouraged at least one fed-
eral trial judge to appoint a technical advisor.3 ' By further de-
creasing judicial reluctance and facilitating communication between
judges and scientists, a cooperative effort like CASE could greatly
increase the frequency with which judges consult outside experts.
Frequent use of technical advisors, however, is troubling.
Federal rules circumscribe judicial authority to appoint expert wit-
nesses and special masters, 32 but no federal rule addresses techni-
cal advisor appointments. 33 Technical advisors represent one of the
most significant departures from the adversary system.34 Appellate
courts review technical advisor appointments only for abuse of dis-
cretion, a very deferential standard.35 The lack of clear limits has
not been a problem in the past because technical advisors were re-
served for exceptional cases and did not threaten adversarial val-
ues. If judges are persuaded that deference to the adversary system
is less appropriate when scientific issues are involved, the protec-
tions of the adversary system may be compromised. 36
This Note considers the checks and limits on the trial judge's
inherent power to appoint technical advisors. Part II of this Note
considers the role of the trial judge in scientifically complex cases.
Part III discusses judicial power to appoint technical advisors and
the factors judges consider when appointing a technical advisor.
Part IV summarizes the CASE project. Part V predicts that coop-
erative efforts between judges and scientists such as CASE will in-
crease the frequency of technical advisor appointments and posits
30. See id.
31. MediaCom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 17, 29 (D. Mass. 1998) (appointing a
technical advisor and citing Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Joiner).
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (special masters); FED. R. EVID. 706 (court-appointed expert wit-
nesses).
33. See Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1988).
34. See infra notes 81-82, 115-18 and accompanying text. Compare Reilly, 863 F.2d at 156-
58, with FED R. EVID. 706(a).
35. See Reilly, 863 F.2d at 156-57 (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by appointing a technical advisor in a case involving complex economic theories); Daniel J. Mea-
dor, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TExL L REV. 1805, 1816-19
(1995) (enumerating limits on inherent authority and noting appellate review for abuse of discre-
tion specifically); cf. Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(describing the inherent power as nebulous with shadowy boundaries); Roger A. Silver, The In-
herent Power of the Florida Courts, 39 U. MiAU L REV. 257, 258-62 (1985) (reviewing the his.
tory of federal separation of powers with the inherent powers of courts in mind).
36. See discussion infra Part V.
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that the current limits on the inherent power to appoint technical
advisors do not adequately protect the role of the parties.37
Part VI proposes alternative limits. Appellate courts could
mandate procedural safeguards in all jurisdictions.3 8 The legisla-
ture could implement statutory limits. A rule analogous to FRE 706
might be enacted to coordinate technical advisors and adversarial
procedures.3 9 Finally, even without affirmative action by appellate
courts or the legislature, trial judges should recognize the dangers
accompanying the frequent use of technical advisors and exercise
prudential self-restraint.40
II. COPING WITH SCIENTIFIC ISSUES IN THE FEDERAL TRIAL
COURTS
The American litigation system is based on the adversarial
process, 41 as opposed to the inquisitorial process. 42 In the pure ad-
versarial process, the parties bear sole responsibility for factual and
legal development. 43 This framework is intended to promote the
truth-finding process, judicial impartiality, and personal
37. See Reilly, 863 F.2d at 156-57; Meador, supra note 35, at 1816.
38. See discussion infra Part VI.A.
39. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
40. See discussion infra Part VI.C.
41. See Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV.
57, 57 (1998) [hereinafter Freedman, Constitutionalized] (noting that the Framers constitution-
alized the American adversary system). See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS' ETHICS 13-42 (1990); JAMES ET AL., supra note 13, §§ 1.2-1.3. The Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may refer to adversarial procedures. See Freedman,
Constitutionalized, supra, at 82 (equating due process with adversary procedures). But see JAMES
ET AL., supra note 13, § 1.2 (observing that the principles underlying the adversary system do not
need to be fully equated with due process).
42. This Note treats "inquisitorial" and "non-adversarial" as synonyms. Cf. Saltzburg, su-
pra note 15, at 14 (noting that American observers traditionally have invoked the modifier "in-
quisitional" to describe non-adversarial alternatives to the American system). Many European
countries operate under the competing inquisitorial system. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery
and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1019.20
(1998); see also Freedman, Constitutionalized, supra note 41, at 74, In inquisitorial systems, the
judge is primarily responsible for the development of the legal case, and the search for the truth
is a collaborative effort between the judge and parties. Id. Inquisitorial systems are criticized
just as heavily as their adversarial counterpart. See, e.g., id. at 76-79. Because the incentive is to
find the sometimes elusive truth and not to elicit the parties' best arguments, examination of the
facts and laws may be less rigorous. Id. at 79. Judges who take an active role early in the case
may form preliminary opinions that cannot be dispelled. Id. Thus, under the inquisitorial sys-
tem, parties may be less likely to receive a fair hearing as measured by contemporary American
standards. Cf. id. at 87-88, 90.
43. See Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34, 35-36 (Harold
J. Berman ed., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1971) (observing that the adversary system requires parties
to develop their own cases to maintain the impartiality of the judge and jury).
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autonomy. 44 In practice, the adversarial process displays certain
systematic deficiencies, and courts sometimes supplement the pure
adversarial model with non-adversarial devices. 45
A. Science and the Federal Trial Judge
Federal trial judges are generalists. 46 When these judges face
complex scientific questions, they may be pushed to the edge of, and
perhaps beyond, their expertise. 47 Technical issues can arise at
various stages and in various types of adjudication. 48 For example,
trial judges must determine the admissibility of scientific
evidence. 49 In patent cases, they must construe patent claims, a
task that requires knowledge of the underlying art.60 In a bench
trial, the judge is responsible for all legal and factual conclusions,
and the judge must be comfortable enough with the subject matter
to control the trial and to reach conclusions. 51 In a jury trial, the
jury has responsibility for factual determinations.5 2 Because lay
44. See Saltzburg, supra note 15, at 11-13, 15-19 (observing that the American adversary
system is used to search for the truth, decreases the chance that a judge will form an early bias,
and gives parties control over their own cases).
45. See infra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
46. Justice Breyer states this proposition in the negative. He notes that judges "are not sci-
entists" and may have a "comparative lack of expertise." Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
148 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
47. See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 70G[01,] at 706-09 CU]t is
naive to expect the trier of fact to be capable of assessing the validity of diametrically opposed
[highly technical] testimony."); cf. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 148 (Breyer, J., concurring); Learned Hand,
Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 51-52
(1901) (arguing that expert testimony is offered as a supplement when the jury's personal knowl-
edge is lacking). Judge Hand noted that using conflicting experts exacerbates the problem. Id.
at 54-55. Lacking knowledge about a technical subject by hypothesis, a layman is not competent
to decide which competing claim is correct Id. at 55.
48. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (relevance and
reliability of evidence); id. at 596 (sufficiency of evidence, including directed verdicts and sum.
mary judgments). "[Scientific and technological] issues may arise across the entire spectrum of
litigation: from mass toxic tort and product liability cases to patent and trademark cases, from
medical malpractice cases to contract cases, from environmental, security, and antitrust cases
even to criminal cases." William W. Schwarzer, Introduction, in REFEREmcz MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVmENCE 1, 1 (1994).
49. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
50. E.g., Data Gen. Corp. v. IBM Corp., 93 F. Supp. 2d 89, 91 (D. Mass. 2000) (describing a
judge's recourse to a technical advisor to help understand underlying subject technology before
construing the language of a patent). See generally Si-Hung Choy, Comment, Judicial Education
After Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.: The Use of Court-Appointed Experts, 47 UCLA L
REv. 1423 (2000) (discussing judicial use of technical advisors and court-appointed in experts in
Markman hearings).
51. See JAMES ETAL., supra note 13, §§ 7.1, 7.2 (stating that the judge is always responsible
for questions of law and is responsible for questions of fact if the case is not tried before a jury).
52. Id. § 7.2.
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jurors may have even more trouble with technical subject matter
than the generalist judge, the judge, although divested of responsi-
bility for factual conclusions, remains active in a jury trial. 3 Thus,
whether jury or bench trial, the judge must have some working
knowledge of the science involved. If the scientific issues are com-
plex or particularly technical, the generalist judge may not be able
to acquire this knowledge through his own efforts.
Assuming judicial decisions must be principled, 54 two solu-
tions are apparent. First, generalist judges could be replaced with
specialists in scientifically complex cases. 55 The specialist judges of
a science court would be technically skilled.5 6 These science courts
would have subject matter jurisdiction over complex or highly tech-
nical scientific cases.5 7 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases, is an
example of a specialized court. 58 Special science courts might as-
sume an analogous structure. Ostensibly, the specialists would be
53. See John W. Wesley, Note, Scientific Evidence and the Question of Judicial Capacity, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 684-85 & n.57 (1984). For example, a judge can admit more question.
able testimony in a bench trial than in a jury trial. See id. at 684 n.57. In any trial, the judge
must determine evidence admissibility. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (requiring the court to deter-
mine admissibility of evidence). In a bench trial, the judge is the fact-finder, and whether the
judge admits or excludes the evidence, the fact-finder has seen the evidence. See Wesley, supra,
at 684-85 n.57 (reciting presumption that a trial judge who mistakenly admits evidence can
ignore that evidence). When the jury is the fact-finder, the judge's decision to admit or exclude
the evidence has greater ramifications because the fact-finder sees the evidence only if the judge
admits it. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a). Without focusing on the differences between bench and jury
trials, this Note considers only the manner in which judges handle technical subject matter.
54. Instead of considering the merits of the disputed issue, the judge could resolve the issue
in favor of the party he liked the best. This solution, however, would violate fundamental
American notions of judicial impartiality and rule of law. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 365-67 (1978) (emphasizing the role of reasoned
argument in adjudication).
55. See Developments in the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108
HARv. L. REv. 1481, 1603-04 (1995) [hereinafter New Challenges] (explaining the concept of
science courts); Edward V. Di Lello, Note, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A Proposal for Expert
Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 493-98 (1993) (proposing expert magistrate
judges); cf. New Challenges, supra, at 1596-97 (explaining the concept of blue ribbon juries).
Blue ribbon juries are analogous to science courts. A blue ribbon jury is composed of technically
competent or proficient individuals. Id. at 1596. While a blue ribbon jury may ameliorate jury
comprehension concerns, the device raises a question of constitutionality under the Seventh
Amendment. Id. at 1596-97; see U.S. CONST. amend. VII CIn Suits at common law.., the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved .... !).
56. New Challenges, supra note 55, at 1603.
57. Id. at 1603-04.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994) (vesting exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals in the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit when the district coures jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338); see Di Lello, supra note 55, at 490-93 (chronicling the history of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA) which became the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC)).
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selected based on their previous experience or training.5 9 Because
the specialist judges would hear only one type of case, they would
accumulate additional experience and knowledge, thus increasing
the judge's competency in that area.60 While science courts have
been proposed, Congress has never implemented the proposal, and
for now, federal trial judges must deal with scientific issues in some
other manner. 61
Second, and more commonly, judges can rely on outside
sources of specialized information. The adversaries or the court
typically choose these outside experts. In the federal courts, the ad-
versaries inform the judge regarding the facts and the law.62 The
parties select and present expert witnesses who testify about the
scientific issues in the case.6 The parties' desire to win the case
provides an incentive to select witnesses whose testimony will illu-
minate their particular theory of the case.
Judges, however, are not strictly limited to the adversaries'
presentations. Judges also may seek help from non-adversarial
third-party experts.64 Experts can assist the court in a number of
ways including educating the judge about the technical subject,
providing the judge with additional information about the subject,
providing an independent opinion, and evaluating the parties' ex-
perts. 65 Ex parte contacts with third parties are generally prohib-
ited and judges must appoint these third-party experts to legiti-
mate their role. 66 Depending on the assistance rendered, third-party
experts are labeled differently and are appointed under different
sources of authority.67 Special masters, court-appointed expert wit-
59. Cf Di Lello, supra note 55, at 492 (noting some CCPA and CAFC judges "possessed
technical expertise when they were appointed").
60. Cf. id. (speculating that the experience CCPA and CAFC judges accumulated made
them more effective).
61. See New Challenges, supra note 55, at 1603-04.
62. See JAMESETAL., supra note 13, § 1.2.
63. See id.
64. See Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) ("Courts have (at least in the absence of
legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments
required for the performance of their duties).
65. See Deason, supra note 6, at 84-98.
66. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3A(4) (1998) (admonishing
judges not to consider ex parte communications on the merits except as authorized by law); id.
Canon 3B(4) (advising judges not to make unnecessary appointments and to avoid favoritism in
making appointments).
67. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (special masters); FED. R. EVID. 706 (court-appointed
expert witnesses); Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d. 149, 154-61 (1st Cir. 1988) (technical advi-
sors).
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nesses, and technical advisors all fall into this category. 68 Court-
appointed expert witnesses and technical advisors only provide or
comment on evidence, but special masters may receive evidence and
perform other judicial functions. 69 Because they perform traditional
judicial functions, special masters are unique and generally are be-
yond the scope of this Note.
All expert appointments originally were justified as exercises
of the trial judge's inherent power.70 Inherent powers are powers
the courts receive when they are created. 71 Basically, a trial judge's
inherent power gives the judge the flexibility to run a courtroom
and try cases. 72 Although not explicitly granted, the powers are im-
plied to the courts, because courts require these powers to carry out
their assigned duties. 73
The inherent power to appoint expert witnesses and special
masters was eventually codified in federal rules.74 No federal rule
addresses the inherent power to appoint a technical advisor. 75 Arti-
cle III limits the amount of judicial power a technical advisor may
68. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (special masters); FED. R. EVID. 706 (court-appointed expert wit.
nesses); Reilly, 863 F.2d. at 155-56 (technical advisors).
69. See, e.g., Active Prods. Corp. v. A.H. Choitz & Co., 163 F.R.D. 274, 282-83 (N.D. Ind.
1995) (listing discovery master, case manager, settlement master, fact-finder, expert advisor,
remedial master, monitor, or claims evaluator as various roles that courts can appoint special
masters to perform); see also Margaret G. Farrell, Special Masters, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 575, 621 (1994) (listing advantages and disadvantages of special master
appointments). Special masters are appointed under FRCP 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 53. Judges often
appoint special masters to help with case management. See Ellen E. Deason, Managing the
Managerial Expert, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 341, 363 (noting that the modern judge performs many
managerial tasks and that judges faced with a "challenging expansion of their role" often dole-
gate managerial tasks to experts).
70. See, e.g., Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (recognizing inherent power of
courts "to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their
duties"). See generally Meador, supra note 35, at 1820. 'The inherent power of a trial judge to
appoint an expert of his own choosing is virtually unquestioned." FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory
committee's note.
71. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (recognizing inherent power to
sanction); see also United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) C'Certain implied
powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution.").
72. See Meador, supra note 35, at 1805. A variety of the trial judge's actions are grounded
in the inherent power. E.g., Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43-44 (recognizing the inherent power of
courts to control admission to their bars and to discipline attorneys appearing before them); Ex
parte Peterson, 253 U.S. at 312 (inherent power allows courts to appoint persons unconnected
with the court).
73. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43.
74. FED. R. CIV. P. 53; FED. R. EVID. 706.
75. This Note argues that technical advisors should be addressed under a rule similar to
FRE 706. Infra Part VI.B.
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exercise,76 and the First Circuit has described procedural safe-
guards that trial judges appointing technical advisors should
follow. 77 Otherwise, technical advisor appointments are subject only
to general appellate review for abuse of discretion.
Court-appointed expert witnesses are testifying experts ap-
pointed under FRE 706 and are often used when the parties have
presented irreconcilable expert testimony or have not presented
adequate expert testimony.78 The court appoints and ultimately se-
lects the witness, although the parties may suggest potential ex-
perts. 79 FRE 706(a) explicitly guarantees the parties' right to cross-
examine a court-appointed expert witness. 80 Thus, these witnesses
represent a modest departure from adversarial norms.
By contrast, technical advisors are non-testifying experts
appointed under the court's inherent power and used as sounding
boards to further the judge's understanding of technical concepts.8 1
Compared to an expert witness, a technical advisor is a more sig-
76. See Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 157-58 (lst Cir. 1988); see also discussion in.
fra Part II.B.
77. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 159-60.
78. FED. R. EVID. 706. See generally Cecil & Willging, supra note 2. FRE 706 is titled
"Court Appointed Experts" and provides:
(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any
party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be ap-
pointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may
appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint ex-
pert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by
the court unless the witness consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be
informed of the witness' duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be
filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have opportu-
nity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of the wit-
ness' findings, if any; the witness' deposition may be taken by any party; and
the witness may be called to testify by the court or any party. The witness
shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party calling
the witness.
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable
compensation in whatever sum the court may allow. The compensation thus
fixed is payable from funds which may be provided by law in criminal cases and
civil actions and proceedings involving just compensation under the fifth
amendment. In other civil actions and proceedings the compensation shall be
paid by the parties in such proportion and at such time as the court directs, and
thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may
authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert
witness.
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule limits the parties in
calling expert witnesses of their own selection.
FED. R. EVID. 706.
79. FED. R. EviD. 706(a).
80. Id. ("The witness shall be subject to cross examination by each part... . (emphasis
added).
81. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 157-58 (defining appropriate functions of a technical advisor).
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nificant departure from the adversary system because parties are
not entitled to cross-examine technical advisors.8 2 Also, judges may
consult technical advisors ex parte without informing the parties of
these consultations. Without cross-examination, the technical advi-
sor's opinions are subjected only to judicial scrutiny.
Judges faced with complex scientific issues may rely on the
traditional adversary system or non-adversarial alternatives. 83
Non-adversarial alternatives differ in the degree to which they de-
part from adversarial norms. The decision to rely solely on the ad-
versaries' presentations or to resort to a non-adversarial alternative
raises fundamental questions about the role of the federal trial
judge.
B. The Distribution of Power Between the Trial Judge and an
Appointee
Article III secures the independence of the judiciary by guar-
anteeing judges a salary which "shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office" and by giving them life tenure condi-
tioned only on "good Behaviour."8 4 Outside experts do not enjoy
these insulations. If a judge delegates too much Article III power to
a non-Article III actor, the judge abdicates the Article III role or,
phrased a bit differently, the delegatee usurps the judicial
function.8 5 Abdication and usurpation refer to the same basic trans-
gression-a non-Article III actor exercising excessive Article III
power.8 6 Examples of unconstitutional delegation in the technical
advisor context include letting an advisor brief the judge on legal
82. Id. at 156.
83. See discussion infra Part II.A.
84. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
85. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957) (finding abdication of the ju.
dicial function when a judge who could handle litigation most efficiently referred the cases to a
special master); Reilly, 863 F.2d at 157 (stating that technical advisors are not judges and may
not be allowed to usurp the judicial function). The abdication issue is usually raised in connec.
tion with appointees or delegatees that perform quintessentially judicial functions. For example,
special masters, bankruptcy judges, and administrative agencies have been the focus of Article
III challenges. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (an ad-
ministrative agency); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 485 U.S. 50, 87 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (bankruptcy judges); La Buy, 352 U.S. at 256 (special master); cf. Margaret G.
Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 235, 289-295
(1997) (considering the constitutionality of the special master rule, FRCP 53).
86. See Reilly, 863 F.2d at 157-58 (referring to the danger as usurpation and citing La Buy
as analogous support).
[Vol. 54:2:547
JUDGES COOPERATING WITH SCIENTISTS
issues and deploying an advisor on an independent fact-finding
mission.87
C. The Distribution of Power Between the Trial Judge and the
Parties
The federal courts employ adversarial procedures.88 The ad-
versary system gives the parties primary responsibility in develop-
ing the case89 and presumes interested parties will research and
develop the best arguments for their respective sides.90 Ideally, this
research and development is conducted within the bounds of the
truth.91 In the simplest two-party case, the opposing parties present
the most persuasive argument for their respective sides.92 The
judge has little or no role in the formation of these arguments. 93
After scrutinizing the competing arguments, the judge decides the
case. 94 The judge's decision is based on the parties' presentation of
the law and facts, and the parties therefore have a powerful incen-
tive to present their most persuasive case and to undermine their
opponent's case to the greatest extent possible.9 5
In theory, the adversary system promotes judicial impartial-
ity, personal autonomy, and rigorous pursuit of the truth.96 Adver-
sarial parties investigate and develop their own arguments.97 If
87. See id. at 158.
88. See JAME_ ST AL., supra note 13, § 1.2.
89. Id.
90. Id. (declaring that the adversary system assumes that the truth is more likely to emerge
when self-interested parties conduct investigations than when non.interested officials conduct
investigations); Fuller, supra note 43, at 35 (arguing that judges can best weigh the sides of a
controversy when partisan advocates advance competing arguments).
91. See JAES ETAL, supra note 13, § 1.2 (asserting that, while the adversary system seeks
to find the truth, it also allows the parties to engage in conduct not designed to elicit the truth);
William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversarial Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U.
PITT. I. REv. 703, 712 (1989) (observing that, in theory, the adversary system is designed to find
the truth, but arguing that, in practice, parties direct their efforts towards winning the case and
not towards uncovering the truth).
92. See JAA.RS ST AL., supra note 13, § 1.2 (noting that parties are responsible for both the
initial prosecution and subsequent presentation of their cases).
93. See Fuller, supra note 43, at 35 (stating that separating the functions of advocate and
judge assures that the judge's final decision is as objective and unbiased as possible).
94. JAMES ET AL., supra note 13, § 1.2 (characterizing the court in an adversary system as
"an essentially passive arbiter"). But see Fuller, supra note 43, at 45 CA more active participa-
tion by the judge-assuming it stops short of a prejudgment of the case itself--can... enhance
the meaning and effectiveness of an adversary presentation.").
95. JAhESSTAL., supra note 13, at § 1.2.
96. An impartial judge is essential to any adjudication system. Fuller, supra note 54, at 365
(arguing that an adjudication system that allows parties to present evidence and reasoned ar-
guments implies a need for impartial judges).
97. See JAMESETAL., supra note 13, at § 1.2.
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judges developed the case themselves, they might form an early im-
pression that would shape their perception of all subsequent evi-
dence. 98 This tendency to pre-judge would threaten judicial impar-
tiality and could skew the truth finding process.9 9 Adversarial case
development lets the parties present the case as they see fit and
enhances the acceptability of decisions. 100
Judges are also responsible for maintaining the institutional
legitimacy of the judiciary, 10 1 because public deference to judgments
and rulings depends on the integrity and independence of judges. 10 2
To the extent the adversary system actually fosters impartiality
and the search for the truth, judicial ethics suggest deference to
that system. 10 3
The adversarial process has drawbacks. 0 4 With scientific is-
sues, the parties may present irreconcilable evidence (the so called
"battle of the experts"). 105 Adversarial presentations may not repre-
sent all affected interests, and the judge may be forced to choose
98. See Fuller, supra note 54, at 382-84 (quoting Lon Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional
Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958)) (arguing that adversarial
presentation of evidence and legal arguments keeps the judge from reaching premature conclu-
sions about a case).
99. Id.; Saltzburg, supra note 15, at 16-17.
100. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 13, § 1.2 C'[T]he moral force and acceptability of a decision
will be greatest when it is made by one who does not have, and does not appear to have, the kind
of psychological commitment to the result that is implied in initiating and conducting the pres.
entation of a case."); see also Saltzburg, supra note 15, at 16-17.
101. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 1 (1998) CA judge ... should
personally observe... [high standards of conduct], so that the integrity and independence of the
judiciary may be preserved.").
102. Id. Canon 1 cmt. Judges are obligated to act in a manner that promotes public confi-
dence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Id. Canon 2A. In consulting outside
experts, the judge must consider the public's perception of the consultation and must not give the
appearance of impropriety. Id. Canon 2A cmt. A judge has acted with the appearance of impro-
priety if the conduct in question would lead a reasonable person, with knowledge of the relevant
circumstances, to believe that the judge's ability to act with impartiality was impaired. Id. The
judge's duty to carefully consider the appearance created by an appointment does not change
even though the parties consent to the appointment. Id. Canon 3B(4) cmt.
103. But cf Richard A. Posner, Coping with the Caseload. A Comment on Magistrates and
Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2217-18 (1989). Judge Posner is less certain that rules pro-
tecting the public image of the judiciary always serve the best interests of justice: "The conflict of
interest rules governing judges are widely recognized to be absurd; their principal function is to
protect judges from adverse newspaper publicity by causing them to steer clear of conflicts so
attenuated that only a journalist would think them worthy of comment (worthy, indeed, of rais-
ing the hue and cry)." Id.
104. See generally JAMES ETAL., supra note 13, § 1.3.
105. See Deason, supra note 6, at 92-93. In the adversary system, parties have an incentive
to choose experts whose testimony will support their theory of the case. Id. at 66. The parties
are by definition adversaries, and the testimony of their chosen experts is likely to point in oppo-
site directions. See id. These conflicts have been characterized as a battle. Id. at 92. Lay judges
and juries are in no position to choose between battling experts. Id. at 66.
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between making an uninformed decision and looking outside the
adversary system for help. 05 Furthermore, the adversarial process
assumes equally competent and financed advocates for each side
when, in reality, resources and talents are uneven.107 Also, the par-
ties' incentive to present the most persuasive case encourages them
to ignore or bend the truth when the truth is harmful to their
case. 08 Pressures on judges also distort the adversarial process.
Modern federal judges have caseloads that rarely allow the type of
time-consuming monitoring necessary to constrain over-zealous ad-
versaries. 109
Despite its flaws, the adversary system will not likely be
displaced in the federal courts.110 Instead, lawmakers have im-
ported inquisitorial devices to cure the most obvious shortcomings
of the pure adversary system. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are representative. Parties conduct discovery, but may be disci-
plined for adversarial behavior that the court deems counter-
productive.1 Most pertinent in this discussion, the judge may ap-
point technical advisors and other third-party experts.11 2 The ad-
106. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 13, § 1.2 ("Party-presentation ... offers no assurance that
parties will present to the court evidence and argument vital to protect the concerns of nonpar-
ties, whose interests a case may affect."); Deason, supra note 6, at 95-96 (noting adversarial
presentations are likely to be inadequate when litigation involves public issues or institutions
because the parties will not represent all affected interests).
107. See Freedman, Constitutionalized, supra note 41, at 88-89 (admitting that the adversary
system may deliver different kinds of justice depending on the socioeconomic status of the par-
ties); see also Deason, supra note 6, at 96 ("The discrepancy in resources and access to informa-
tion in cases brought by prison inmates and others housed in state institutions undoubtedly has
contributed to the frequent court appointment of experts during the liability phase of such litiga-
tion.").
108. Schwarzer, supra note 91, at 714 (arguing that adversarial techniques are generally
counterproductive during discovery and pretrial). The emphasis in discovery and pre-trial is
party collaboration; however, confrontational adversarial procedures discourage such desired
collaboration. Id.
109. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 62 fig.3.1, 63
fig.3.2 (1996) (depicting the growth of the federal caseload on an absolute and a proportional
scale); id. at 160-189 (noting the streamlining of the adjudication process to meet the demands of
the expanded federal caseload). The burgeoning federal caseload induces trial judges to encour-
age early settlements, and judges focus on the pre.trial development of the case more closely.
See Schwarzer, supra note 91, at 703. Modern judges employ proactive techniques to keep the
parties on track and to control the inefficient excesses of the adversary system. Id. at 704-05.
110. The inquisitorial system has critical failings from an American viewpoint. For a brief
comparison of the inquisitorial and adversary systems, see supra note 42.
111. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (establishing that parties may obtain discovery of in-
formation "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"), with FED. R.
Civ. P. 37 (providing for sanctions against parties who fail to comply with discovery requests).
FRCP 11 gives the judge a more general power to sanction counter-productive adversarial be-
havior. FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c).
112. See FED. . Civ. P. 53 (special masters); FED. R. EVID. 706 (court-appointed expert wit-
nesses); Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 154-56 (1st Cir. 1988) (technical advisors); see also
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versary system presumes the parties can adequately educate the
judge regarding technical issues,"3 but if the parties do not, a judge
may compensate by appointing a technical advisor.
D. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Technical Advisors
A technical advisor appointment disrupts the adversary sys-
tem's traditional distribution of power between the trial judge and
the parties."4 Experts appointed as technical advisors are not sub-
ject to cross-examination and may be consulted ex parte by the
judge." 5 The technical advisor may convey a significant amount of
information to the judge without party knowledge or scrutiny."6
This likelihood substantially decreases the parties' roles in case de-
velopment and impinges on their personal autonomy. Technical ad-
visor appointments may also undermine the truth-finding process
and judicial impartiality. For example, judges may "give up" on the
push and pull of the adversary system when a top-flight technical
advisor is just a phone call away. Or, judges may be overly deferen-
tial to scientific experts. 17 Without adversarial testing, the parties
cannot expose the shortcomings of a one-sided presentation or the
potential biases of the advisor." 8
On the other hand, technical advisors might remedy some
failings of the adversary system. When informing the judge about
scientific issues, adversarial parties often select diametrically op-
posed experts." 9 The generalist judge, by definition, lacks knowl-
edge about the subject of their testimony and may not be able to
weigh the merits of experts' testimony. 120 A disinterested technical
advisor might help the judge evaluate the conflicting testimony.'12
Furthermore, shielding technical advisors from the parties
might help courts get better scientific advice in the first instance.
Many scientists believe that adversarial procedures distort their
Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1920) (acknowledging the inherent power of trial courts
to appoint outside assistance).
113. See JAMES ETAL., supra note 13, § 1.2.
114. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
115. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 159, 160 n.8.
116. See id. at 160 n.8 (stating that a trial judge and technical advisor should be permitted to
communicate informally).
117. Deason, supra note 6, at 122, 138-41; cf discussion infra note 271 (distinguishing be-
tween the level of deference likely afforded to scientific experts and law clerks).
118. Deason, supra note 6, at 136.
119. A battle of experts results. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 47 and sources cited therein.
121. Jackson, supra note 6, at 453-54.
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testimony and feel alienated by the adversarial process. 122 As a re-
sult, some scientists will not testify as expert witnesses.123 Some
commentators believe the remaining experts who do testify are not
legitimate scientists, but are actually "expert witnesses for hire"
who testify in favor of parties without regard for the actual scien-
tific issues involved.124 The technical advisor role might be more
appealing to "real" scientific experts and thus some commentators
argue more frequent use of technical advisors would elevate the
quality of science in the courts. 125
Technical advisors occupy uneasy middle ground. Article HI
limits the duties a judge may delegate to a technical advisor. 26
Otherwise, limits are a matter of judicial discretion. m  The adver-
sary system normally reserves significant control to the parties,
and the use of technical advisors runs counter to this central adver-
sarial tenet.'2 Freedom from adversarial constraints, however, al-
lows technical advisors to provide information in a manner un-
tainted by allegiance to one of the parties and may make participa-
tion in trials more attractive to better scientists.29 Although tech-
nical advisors are appointed under the trial judge's inherent power,
and no federal rule guides the exercise of the power,1 the judge's
discretion is not completely unfettered. The United States Supreme
Court has given guidance to trial judges attempting to balance tra-
ditional deference to the adversary system against the desire for
innovation.
E. Guidance from the United States Supreme Court
In recent admissibility cases, the United States Supreme
Court has addressed the trial judge's responsibility with regard to
122. Id. at 453; see Deason, supra note 6, at 67-69 (noting scientists historically have been ill-
disposed toward adversarial methods of searching for the truth); see also Jackson, supra note 6,
at 453; cf. Di Lello, supra note 55, at 480-82 (describing difficulties associated with the adver-
sarial presentation of scientific testimony).
123. Jackson, supra note 6, at 453.
124. E.g., Di Lello, supra note 55, at 474-75; Jackson, supra note 6, at 453; se Deason, supra
note 6, at 66-67 (noting that this criticism is long-standing).
125. E.g., Jackson, supra note 6, at 453; cf. Di Lelo, supra note 55, at 474-75.
126. See Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 157-58 (Ist Cir. 1988); see also discussion su-
pra Part HI.B.
127. See discussion supra Part II.C.
128. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
130. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 155 (concluding that FRE 706 does not reach the subject of non-
testifying experts).
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scientific issues. 18 1 The "gatekeeping" demands placed on federal
judges under the Court's ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc., force trial judges to attempt to understand often
complex scientific issues. 3 2 Adversarial procedures are the default,
but not exclusive, method for dealing with scientific issues. 18 3 Two
years after Daubert in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, Justice Breyer
issued a concurring opinion that encouraged more frequent consul-
tation of outside experts. 18 4 These opinions guide trial judges in the
discharge of the judicial function when scientific issues are in-
volved.
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
In Daubert, despite plaintiffs' evidence that the anti-nausea
drug Bendectin caused birth defects, the district court granted de-
fendant's request for summary judgment because the plaintiffs' sci-
entific evidence was not generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community. 3 5 The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion affirming the district court and remanded. 18 6 The Court held
trial judges may not exclude scientific evidence solely on the basis
that it was not derived using generally accepted methods. 18 7 Nor
can the trial judge admit scientific evidence as a matter of course
relying on the adversary system to distinguish between good and
bad evidence. 38 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial
judge must assess scientific evidence for relevance and reliability. 18 9
The Daubert Court suggested four factors that the trial judge could
consult in determining admissibility. 140 Theories and techniques
131. See generally Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
132. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95.
133. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (acknowledging that FRE 702 requires the judge to perform some "gatekeeping" role to
scientific evidence).
134. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 149-50 (Breyer, J., concurring).
135. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582-84. Prior to Daubert, general acceptance was a widely ac.
cepted test for determining admissibility of scientific evidence. Id. at 585. The "general accep-
tance" test originated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and was called the
Frye test. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-86.
136. Id. at 597-98.
137. Id. at 589.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 592-95. This holding has been codified in the new FRE 702. See generally Cath-
erine E. Brixen & Christine M. Meis, Note, Codifying the "Daubert Trilogy!' The Amendment to
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 527 (2000).
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that have been tested,141 subjected to peer review and publication, 42
and generally accepted by the scientific community are more likely
to produce admissible evidence. 143 The fourth factor that may be
considered is whether a particular scientific technique has a known
or potential rate of error and standards that control the operation of
the technique. 144
The Court noted in passing the trial judge's ability to ap-
point experts under FRE 706,145 and observed that adversarial pro-
cedures could determine the merit of questionable evidence. 146 The
defendant worried that an admissibility standard other than gen-
eral acceptance in the scientific community would lead to jury con-
fusion.147 The Court replied: "In this regard respondent seems to us
to be overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and of the
adversary system generally. Vigorous cross-examination, presenta-
tion of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
but admissible evidence." 14s The Federal Rules of Evidence provide
for summary judgment orders and directed verdicts if evidence does
not survive adversarial testing.149 The adversary system, it seems,
should be presumed equal to the challenges scientific issues may
present.
At a general level, the Court held that the Federal Rules of
Evidence require trial judges to attempt to understand scientific
evidence. 150 Trial judges cannot avoid their "gatekeeping" duty by
relying on the adversarial process.15' The Court then established a
framework for resolving scientific evidence admissibility
disputes; 152 judges should resolve most admissibility disputes
141. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
142. Id. The court noted that admissibility did not depend on publication and that publica-
tion was not necessarily correlated with reliability. Id. Nonetheless, peer review and publica-
tion "increase[] the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected." Id.
143. Id. at 594. Although the Court held that admissibility could not be conditioned on gen-
eral acceptance in the scientific community, the Court did not say that general acceptance was
immaterial. Id. at 589, 594. Rather, general acceptance was a factor to consider in determining
relevance and reliability. Id.
144. Id. at 594.
145. Id. at 595.
146. Id. at 596 (expressing optimism about the capabilities of the jury and the adversary sys-
tem).
147. Id. at 595.
148. Id. at 596.
149. Id. (citing FRCP 50(a) and FRCP 56).
150. Id. at 592.
151. Id. at 589.
152. Id. at 592-95.
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within this framework based on adversarial presentations. 5 3 If
pure adversarial resolution is not feasible, the Federal Rules pro-
vide remedies such as court-appointed expert witnesses, summary
judgment orders, and directed verdicts. 54
Daubert addressed only the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence, but the principles are general. The Court clearly indicated
that the mere presence of scientific issues in a case does not war-
rant a wholesale shift away from adversarial procedures. 1 5 The
Court expressed confidence in the adversarial process's adaptability
to scientific issues. 156 A federal trial judge could depart from the
adversary system, but the Court discussed only departures author-
ized by the Federal Rules of Evidence. 157
2. General Electric Co. v. Joiner
The Court returned to the question of admissibility of scien-
tific evidence in General Electric Co. v. Joiner.15 8 The Court held
that appellate courts should not apply a more stringent standard of
review to trial court exclusions of scientific testimony. 159 Justice
Breyer filed a concurring opinion that addressed the difficult posi-
tion of trial judges. 160 Trial judges are not scientists, but they are
called upon to evaluate the reliability of scientific evidence. 1 1 He
noted that trial judges could appoint special masters and special-
ized law clerks, and cited FRE 706 as a vehicle by which judges
could appoint their own experts. 62 Justice Breyer drew particular
153. Id. at 595-96.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 596.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 595-96.
158. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
159. Id. at 143. In Joiner, the plaintiff had offered expert testimony to support his case. Id.
at 140. The district court believed that the testimony was inadmissible because it did not riso
above subjective belief or unsupported speculation and granted summary judgment for the do.
fendants. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. Id. The court hold that
exclusion of expert testimony should be subjected to a standard of review more stringent than
abuse of discretion and found that the district court should have admitted the testimony of plain.
tiffs expert witnesses. Id. at 140-41. The Supreme Court found that the Eleventh Circuit incor-
rectly applied this more stringent level of review and reversed. Id. at 141, 143. The proper stan-
dard of review was abuse of discretion. Id. at 146. Furthermore, the Court found that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion. Id. at 146-47.
160. Id. at 147-50 (Breyer, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 147-48 (Breyer, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 149, 150 (Breyer, J., concurring). Observers have drawn an analogy between law
clerks and technical advisors. See, e.g., Ass'n of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 195
F.3d 465, 493 & n.31 (9th Cir. 1999) (likening a technical advisor to a law clerk), withdrawn, 208
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attention to a New England Journal of Medicine amici brief that
encouraged judges to use their inherent authority to appoint ex-
perts. 163 The amici brief suggested the American Association for the
Advancement of Science ("AAAS") as a body that might recommend
reputable experts to courts.164 Justice Breyer opined that, with help
from the scientific community, judges could successfully discharge
their role as gatekeepers. 165
At first glance, Justice Breyer's concurrence and Daubert
seem at odds. Daubert suggested deference to the adversary system,
whereas Justice Breyer invites trial judges to experiment with non-
adversarial methods when confronted with scientific issues.166 The
two opinions may be harmonized by recognizing that Daubert coun-
seled deference to the adversary system, yet left the door open to
non-adversarial alternatives authorized by federal rules.167 Justice
Breyer expanded on this opening and identified other non-
adversarial alternatives including options not codified in the federal
rules.168
Justice Breyer's message of cooperative innovation resonates
with some judges and scientists. Several judges recently have ap-
pointed technical advisors and have cited his concurring opinion as
support. 69 Moreover, CASE puts judges in contact with scientists
who are willing to serve as court-appointed experts and thereby fa-
cilitates cooperation between judges and scientists. 170 Despite this
gaining momentum, the cooperative spirit should be balanced
against Daubert's rule of deference. Daubert, a majority opinion of
F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Address at the American Assacia-
tion for the Advancement of Science Annual Meeting and Science Innovation Exposition (Feb. 16,
1998) (transcript available at http:/wwv.aaas.org/meetings/1998/breyer98.htm) (approving of
technical advisors). Contra Deason, supra note 6, at 139-141. For an argument against this law
clerk analogy, see infra note 271.
163. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 149-50 (Breyer, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 150 (Breyer, J., concurring). The AAAS is the organization sponsoring CASE.
Runkle, supra note 9.
165. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 150 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Stephen Breyer, Introduction,
in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1, 7 (2d ed. 2000) (endorsing CASE).
166. Compare Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993), with Joiner,
522 U.S at 150 (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting that the legal community should cooperate
with the scientific community).
167. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596; supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
168. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 150 (Breyer, J., concurring).
169. MediaCom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 17,29 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing Justice
Breyer's Joiner concurrence to support cooperative work between courts and the scientific com-
munity and proceeding to appoint a technical advisor); see also Ass'n of Mexican-American Edu-
cators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 590 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Justice Breyer's concurrence to
support the appointment of a technical advisor).
170. Runkle, supra note 9.
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the Court, indicates judges should defer to adversarial procedures
for most cases involving scientific issues. 171 For cases in which a
third-party expert may be helpful, trial judges can still accommo-
date adversarial norms by involving the adversaries to the extent
possible. 172 Daubert suggests a conservative approach to third party
appointments, emphasizing party involvement.
III. BACKGROUND ON TECHNICAL ADVISORS
In Ex parte Peterson, the United States Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that trial courts have inherent power to appoint per-
sons unconnected with the court to aid in the dispatch of judicial
duties. 17 38 The tasks these appointees may properly perform include
taking and reporting on testimony, auditing and stating accounts,
making computations, determining the actual questions at issue in
complicated trials, and hearing conflicting evidence and making
findings. 74 Ex parte Peterson supports the appointment of special
masters, testifying experts, and technical advisors. 175
Subsequent to Ex parte Peterson, FRCP 53(b) and FRE 706
respectively codified the inherent power of the trial judge to appoint
special masters and expert witnesses. Following this codification,
questions arose concerning the relationship between the specific
Federal Rules and the trial judge's broader inherent power to ap-
point experts. Technical advisors were appointed under FRCP
53(b), 176 and some litigants argued that FRCP 53(b) and FRE 706
were the exclusive repositories of inherent power to appoint ex-
perts.177 These litigants viewed the Rules as exclusive grants of
171. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
172. Id.
173. Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920).
174. Id. at 313.
175. Id. (special masters); see Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 144, 154 n.4 (lst Cir. 1988)
(citing Ex parte Peterson as support for a technical advisor appointment); Scott v. Spanjer Bros.,
Inc., 298 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1961) (citing Exparte Peterson as support for a testifying export
appointment).
176. See Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 746 (6th Cir. 1979) (advancing FRCP
53(b) or the trial courts inherent power, but not FRE 706, as a source of authority for the district
coures appointment of technical advisors); Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 762
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (Weinstein, J.) (describing FRCP 53(b) as broad enough to support appointment
of a technical adviser).
177. See Reilly, 863 F.2d at 154 (rejecting appellants argument that FRE 706 subsumed the
inherent power of trial judge's to appoint technical advisors); Reilly v. United States, 682 V.
Supp. 150, 153 (D.R.I. 1988) (rejecting defendants argument that the trial court did not have
authority to appoint a technical advisor), afl'd, 863 F.2d 149 (lst Cir. 1988); Hemstreet v. Bur.
roughs Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1096, 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that an
expert who did not offer his or her own expert opinion regarding the merits of the case was still
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power and argued that a judge could appoint an expert only if that
judge complied with either FRCP 53(b) or FRE 706.178 Confronted
with these arguments, the threshold issue for the First Circuit in
Reilly v. United States was whether FROP 53(b) or FRE 706 sub-
sumed the trial judge's inherent power to appoint technical advi-
sors.
179
A. Judicial Power to Appoint Technical Advisors:
Reilly v. United States
The district judge in Reilly v. United States needed to esti-
mate future earning capacity for an infant negligently injured at
birth.180 The court characterized the issues presented as "issues of
profound economic complexity" and appointed a university faculty
member as a technical advisor. 181 At the urging of the United
States, 82 the district judge held a hearing regarding his intent to
appoint this technical advisor. 183 At this hearing, the United States
did not object to the appointment and even indicated
acquiescence. 18 After the trial, the United States moved for a new
trial and, following the denial of its motion, appealed to the First
Circuit Court of Appeals. 85 Among other claims, the United States
asserted that a technical advisor appointed under the district
court's inherent authority was subject to FRE 706; that the district
court abused its discretion in appointing a technical advisor at all;
that the technical advisor exceeded his proper role; and that fun-
subject to FRE 706(a)), rev'd on other grounds, No. 87-1512, 1988 WL 93121, at *1 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 9, 1988).
178. See infra notes 187-193 and accompanying text.
179. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 149.
180. Reilly, 682 F. Supp. at 152.
181. Id.
182. The assistant United States Attorney learned that the judge was looking for a technical
advisor when he contacted a faculty member the judge had previously contacted. Reilly, 863
F.2d at 153. The faculty member told the attorney the judge had previously contacted him. Id.
The attorney immediately requested a chambers conference. Id. The court held such a confer-
ence and informed the parties of his intent to appoint a technical advisor and the steps the judge
had already followed to that end. Id. at 153-54.
183. Id. at 160.
184. Id. at 160 n.9. When the court indicated it wanted further expertise, the attorney for
the United States responded, "Sure. We were thinking the same way." Id. Following an adverse
outcome in the district court, the United States appealed and argued that the technical advisor
appointment was improper. Id. at 154. Although the First Circuit agreed that the trial judge
should have implemented some basic procedural safeguards, it construed the United States'
initial acquiescence as a waiver. Id. at 160.
185. Id. at 154.
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damental fairness required that technical advisor appointments
comply with certain procedural safeguards. 186
The First Circuit addressed these issues in turn. The court
first noted the district court had inherent authority to appoint an
expert as a technical advisor. 8 7 In a footnote, the court declined to
address whether FRCP 53(b) might also support a technical advisor
appointment. 188 The court then examined FRE 706 to determine if
the Rule encompassed all expert appointments. 189 The court rea-
soned that the language of FRE 706 addresses only expert wit-
nesses, 190 and that "[t]he Civil Rules . . .were never meant to be-
come the sole repository of all of a federal court's authority."'191
Therefore, the court held that FRE 706 applies only to court-
appointed expert witnesses and that trial judges have inherent
authority to appoint technical advisors independent of the Federal
Rules. 192 Because technical advisors were not court-appointed ex-
pert witnesses, FRE 706's mandatory cross-examination and depo-
sition provisions did not apply to them. 193
In reviewing the district court's decision to appoint a techni-
cal advisor for abuse of discretion, the appellate court articulated
different standards. 194 The court noted that technical advisor ap-
pointments should be rare. 195 Such appointments should be resorted
to only when the subject matter exceeds the judge's expertise 96 and
when doing so will not disrupt the judge's proper role. 197 Because
186. Id. at 154-61.
187. Id. at 154.
188. Id. at 154 n.4
189. Id. at 156.
190. Id. The text of FRE 706 refers not to "experts," but to "expert witnesses." FED, R. EVID.
706. The court inferred from this language that FRE 706 was not meant to include al expert
appointments, but only expert witness appointments. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 156.
191. Id. at 156.
192. Id. at 154 & n.4, 155-56.
193. Id. at 155.
194. Id. at 156-57.
195. Id. at 156-57. In an oft-quoted passage, the court speculated that circumstances war-
ranting an appointment would be "hen's-teeth rare." Id. at 156-57, quoted in Cecil & Willging,
supra note 2, at 1003. The court also declared that "such appointments should be the exception
and not the rule ... [and] if not a last, a near-to-last resort." Id. at 156, 157; cf. FED. R. CIV. P.
53(b) ('A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule.").
196. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 156-57. The court explained that a trial could appoint a technical
advisor "where the introduction of outside skills and expertise, not possessed by the judge, will
hasten the just adjudication of a dispute without dislodging the delicate balance of the juristic
role;" or in response to a "cognizable judicial need for specialized skills;" or when "faced with
problems of unusual difficulty, sophistication, and complexity, involving something well beyond
the regular questions of fact and law with which judges must routinely grapple." Id.
197. Id. at 156-57.
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Reilly involved complex economic theories and the parties had
failed to adequately inform the judge, 98 the appellate court found
that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he appointed
the technical advisor.1 99
The court next held that the technical advisor performed his
duties consistent with the limits inherent in the role.200 Properly
employed, a technical advisor acts as a sounding board to the
judge.201 The advisor helps the judge with technical language and
assists the judge in thinking through complex issues.20 2 The techni-
cal advisor does not testify and does not contribute evidence. 2 3 If a
judge permits an appointee to overstep these bounds, the judge ef-
fectively abdicates the Article III role and thereby violates the Con-
stitution.20 4 Although the court agreed that it would have been bet-
ter if the trial judge had explained the way in which he intended to
use the advisor in writing,205 the court found that the trial judge
properly defined the technical advisor's role and adhered to those
limits.2 06
Finally, the court examined procedural safeguards necessary
to ensure fundamental fairness. 207 The court noted several advis-
able safeguards: notice to the parties of a proposed expert's identity
with an opportunity to object to the appointment, a description of
the technical advisor's job available for party examination, and an
affidavit in which the technical advisor avers compliance with the
job description.208 The court specifically found that a written report
of the advisor's findings was not necessary.20 9 While omission of one
of these safeguards might warrant reversal in another case, the ap-
pellant waived its claim to procedural safeguards when it did not
198. The party experts conflicted on some points, and the government's presentation was in-
adequate. Id. at 157. The First Circuit also noted that the technical issues were important in the
case. Id.
199. Id. at 157.
200. Id. at 159.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 157-58; cf. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1957) (holding that
referring the general issues of two suits to a special master constituted an abdication of the judi-
cial function).
205. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 158.
206. Id. at 157.
207. Id. at 159.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 160 n.8. In the court's view, a written report would serve no function because the
technical advisor cannot introduce new evidence. Id. Furthermore, a written report could not
capture the "freewheeling" conversations the court anticipated between trial judges and technical
advisors. Id.
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object to the advisor appointment at the hearing convened at its
request.210
The Reilly court's approach to technical advisors has been
adopted by the Federal Judicial Centerl- and has influenced judges
outside of the First Circuit.212 Particularly, a Ninth Circuit dissent
recently advocated adoption of procedural safeguards substantially
similar to the Reilly safeguards. 213 To summarize the Reilly safe-
guards, the judge's inherent power to appoint a technical advisor is
not circumscribed or subsumed by FRCP 53(b) or FRE 706.214 None-
210. Id. at 160.
211. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Court Appointed Experts, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 534, 569 (1994).
212. See, e.g., Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 972 F.2d 304, 308 n.8 (10th Cir. 1992)
(finding that a district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow a party to depose or
cross-examine a technical advisor and citing Reilly); United States v. Hsu, 185 F.R.D. 192, 196.
97 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (recounting procedures used to appoint a technical advisor and citing Reilly).
213. Ass'n of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 609-15 (9th Cir. 2000)
(Tashima, J., dissenting). The Mexican-American Educators majority opinion did not consider
whether procedural safeguards were appropriate. Id. at 612 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
Although Judge Tashima classifies the procedural safeguards a bit differently and draws
from other sources, id. at 610-13 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (citing Note, Improving Judicial Gate.
keeping: Technical Advisors and Scientific Evidence, 110 HARV. L. REV. 941 (1997) [hereinafter
Improving Judicial Gatekeeping]), his dissent approves of and elaborates on the procedural safe-
guards proposed in Reilly, id. at 609-15 (Tashima, J., dissenting). He would require the district
court to:
(1) utilize a fair and open procedure for appointing a neutral technical advisor;
(2) address any allegations of bias, partiality, or lack of qualification; (3) clearly
define and limit the technical advisor's duties; (4) make clear to the technical
advisor that any advice he gives to the court cannot be based on any extra-
record information; and (5) make explicit, either through an expert's report or a
record of ex parte communications, the nature and content of the technical ad-
visor's advice.
Id. at 611 (footnote omitted).
Judge Tashima's first two safeguards correspond with the Reilly court's requirements for no-
tice and an opportunity to object safeguard. Id. at 611-12 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (citing Reilly,
863 F.2d at 159). The third safeguard is the same as Reilly's requirement of a written job de-
scription. Id. at 612-13 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (citing Reilly, 863 F.2d at 158). The fourth
safeguard is a clarification and corollary to the written job description safeguard; in defining the
technical advisor's role, the judge should emphasize the limited universe of information that may
be considered. Id. (Tashima, J., dissenting). The fifth safeguard is the only truly new safeguard.
Whereas Reilly would not have required a written record of the technical advisor's advice, Judge
Tashima would require some type of written record. Id. (Tashima, J., dissenting). He thinks
technical advisors, unlike law clerks, may have too much sway with judges and that a written
record of their advice would facilitate appellate review to guard against this abuse. Id. at 613
(Tashima, J., dissenting); see also infra note 271 (briefly summarizing the argument against a
law clerk analogy).
214. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 154 n.4, 156. But see Improving Judicial Gatekeeping, supra note
213, at 951-52 (arguing that Daubert may have implicitly overruled Reilly and might require
that all experts be appointed under FRE 706).
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theless, appointments should be rare.21 5 A technical advisor ap-
pointment is warranted only if the adversary system cannot provide
a judge with needed information. 216 While the parties do not have a
right to cross-examine or depose the technical advisor, party in-
volvement decreases the disruption to the adversarial process. 217
Therefore, procedural safeguards such as notice and an opportunity
to object, a written job description, and the technical advisor's
sworn statement that he or she did not exceed his or her job de-
scription are desirable.218 These safeguards define and memorialize
the proposed and actual role of the technical advisor and give the
parties a chance to object when a judge may be improperly using an
advisor.219 Party objections may become the basis of an appeal, and
if so, the written job description and the affidavit demonstrating
the advisor's compliance or non-compliance with the job description
will facilitate appellate review. The end result should be more effec-
tive appellate review that should translate into a better check on
the trial court's inherent power to appoint technical advisors.
B. Factors Affecting a Trial Judge's Decision to Appoint a
Technical Advisor
Consistent with the Reilly court's admonitions, cases re-
porting technical advisor appointments have been relatively rare.20
While it would seem that the number of reported cases should be
proportional to the prevalence of technical advisors, the number of
cases may not be a reliable indicator of the frequency with which
judges appoint technical advisors. Two researchers found that
judges use FRE 706 expert witnesses far more often than the rela-
tively small number of reported cases might suggest.21 The re-
searchers opined that reported cases did not represent the actual
215. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 156-57; see Cecil & Willging, supra note 211, at 534 (quoting Reilly
for the proposition that technical advisor appointments should be "hen's-teeth rare" or a "near-to-
last resort").
216. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 156-57.
217. Id. at 159-60; see Cecil & Willging, supra note 211, at 568-69 (contending that the
courts need for assistance must be balanced against the interest of the parties in participating in
the presentation and refutation of the evidence).
218. Cecil & Willging, supra note 211, at 568-69.
219. Id. For example, a party might object that a suggested expert was biased or inexperi-
enced. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 159.
220. Cf. Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 1002-03 (noting few cases discuss technical advi-
sors).
221. See Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 1004 (estimating that judges responding to their
survey had made 225 appointments and characterizing this number as far greater than "the
paucity of published opinions dealing with the exercise of this authority").
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number of appointments, because reported cases address only dis-
puted appointments. 222 Furthermore, appointments in settled cases
are not reported.223 Assuming that these considerations apply to
expert witness and technical advisor appointments alike, judges
probably appoint technical advisors more often than the number of
reported cases suggests. Even so, technical advisor appointments
appear to occur infrequently.224
One explanation for the low incidence of technical advisor
appointments is that the respect the Reilly court indicated for the
adversary system pervades the thinking of judges inside and out-
side of the First Circuit.225 This intuition is borne out in a recent
survey of federal judges and in cases following Reilly.
1. The Cecil-Willging Study
The survey of Federal Judicial Center researchers Joe S. Ce-
cil and Thomas E. Willging offers further insight into the reasons
judges decide not to appoint a technical advisor.2 26 While the survey
focused on expert witnesses, 2 27 the issues raised by technical advi-
sor and testifying expert appointments are similar enough to per-
mit an analogy.228 The researchers found that judges decided not to
appoint an expert for two main reasons.229 First, the judges indi-
cated that cases requiring the assistance of an expert are few.2 80
222. Id. at 1004 n.35.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1004; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149-50 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (advising judges to make greater use of their power to appoint experts).
225. Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 156-57 (lst Cir. 1988).
226. Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 1015-19.
227. Id. at 997 n.7. The researchers first sent a one-page questionnaire to all federal district
court judges. Id. Based on questionnaire responses, the researchers conducted telephone inter.
views with willing judges who had made FRE 706 appointments in the past or who had strong
feelings about FRE 706 appointments. Id.
228. The power to appoint a testifying expert under FRE 706 is a particularized codification
of the judge's more general inherent power. FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee's notes;
Reilly, 863 F.2d at 156 (holding that FRE 706 circumscribes the power of a court to designate
expert witnesses, but does not subsume the inherent power to appoint experts); Deason, supra
note 6, at 79-80 (stating that, although the title of FRE 706, "Court Appointed Experts," seem-
ingly includes all experts the court appoints, courts have held that the rule addresses only testi-
fying experts). Testifying experts can be deposed and cross-examined by the parties, and so,
from the standpoint of the adversary system, represent a smaller incursion than technical advi-
sors. FED. R. EVID. 706(a); see also discussion supra notes 122.25. Since technical advisors are
more disruptive to the adversary system than testifying experts, factors weighing against ap-
pointment of a testifying expert could be expected to weigh just as heavily against the appoint-
ment of a technical advisor.
229. Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 1015.
230. Id. at 1015-16.
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Second, the judges intimated respect for the adversary system.231 In
articulating this respect, some judges indicated general esteem for
the adversary system, and other judges indicated a more specified
choice to accede to the parties' desire not to involve outside
experts.232 Judges preferred not to appoint an expert unless the ad-
versary system could not or did not provide the judge with the in-
formation necessary to settle the dispute. 233
The researchers' survey also reported on expert selection.
Some judges experienced trouble with the selection process, s but
most judges who actually appointed experts had little trouble find-
ing an expert.235 While this response might indicate that judges
generally have little trouble contacting qualified experts, another
explanation exists. The researchers primarily contacted judges who
had appointed experts under FRE 706 in the past.23 6 These par-
ticular judges, representing only twenty percent of all federal trial
judges, may have contacts with scientists that facilitate expert
identification. 237 Indeed, the researchers found that, in twenty-nine
of the forty-one cases in which the judge appointed an expert with-
231. Id. at 1018-19.
232. Id. Comments such as the following expressed judicial support for the adversary sys-
tem:
I believe in the adversary system .... I don't feel comfortable taking over
the case .... I don't know why I would be better equipped than the lawyers to
find a top-flight person.
[The lawyers are pretty good about shooting holes in each others' experts.
It's generally a credibility question and the jury can sort it out.
We're conditioned to respect the adversary system. If a lawyer fails to ex-
plain the basis for a case, that's his problem.
In general, it conflicts with my sense of the judicial role, which is to trust
the adversaries to present information and arguments. I do not believe the
judge should normally be an inquisitor.
Id.
233. Id. at 1009-12. Some judges also suggested that appointing an expert might aid settle-
ment. Id. at 1012. Contra id. (reporting that some judges will not appoint an expert if settlement
is likely). Such appointments may be viewed as responses to adversarial failings. Polarized
expert testimony may prevent the parties from reaching a settlement agreement. Id. at 1013.
Therefore, settlement may be more likely when the court's neutral expert resolves the divisive
issue. Id. at 1013-14. Even the threat of an appointment may keep the parties "honest and
deter partisan conduct that does not facilitate the truth-finding process. FED. R. EvID. 706 advi-
sory committee's note ('The ever-present possibility that the judge may appoint an expert in a
given case must inevitably exert a sobering effect on the expert witness of a party and upon the
person utilizing his services."); Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 1014 (suggesting threat of ap-
pointment may have an in terroremn effect).
234. Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 1022. Fourteen judges said they had trouble identi-
fying a suitable neutral expert. Id. Some judges had trouble finding an unbiased expert with the
necessary knowledge. Id. Still, other judges did not know how to initiate the process. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 997 n.7.
237. Id. at 1004, 1023.
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out suggestions by the party, the judge used pre-existing personal
or professional contacts to identify an expert.238 A system relying on
personal and professional contacts has drawbacks. Selection based
on the judge's contacts does not ensure that the expert is unbiased
or well informed. 239
Furthermore, compensation issues might deter judges from
appointing technical advisors. 240 FRE 706(b) explicitly provides for
compensation for FRE 706 appointees, 241 but compensation for
technical advisors is left to the judge's discretion. 242 The researchers
specifically noted technical advisor compensation problems. 243 All
things considered, it is likely that the practical burdens associated
with appointing a technical advisor impede appointments by the
judiciary as a whole even though many interviewed judges did not
cite the selection process as a barrier to appointment.
2. The Cases
Judicial opinions also provide insight into the reasons judges
do and, largely by negative implication, do not appoint technical
advisors. Consistent with their articulated respect for the adversary
system, judges try to limit appointments to instances in which that
system is ineffective. 244 In recent years, technical advisors have
238. Id. at 1023.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1053-54.
241. FED. R. EVID. 706(b).
242. See, e.g., MediaCom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 17, 29-30, 36 (D. Mass.
1998) (taxing technical advisor costs to the parties).
243. See Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 1053-54. The courts have not derived a depend.
able and satisfactory method for compensating technical advisors. Id. In the past, judges have
used three imperfect options. First, the parties may agree to compensate the technical advisor.
Id. This method leaves the court and technical advisor at the mercy of the same parties whose
non-constructive adversarial behavior may have led to the appointment in the first place. Sec-
ond, if a technical advisor serves under FRE 706, the court may compensate the advisor under
FRE 706(b). FED. R. EVID. 706(b); Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 1053-54. But courts prefer
to appoint technical advisors using their inherent power because the technical advisors ap-
pointed under the inherent power can be consulted more freely. Compare FED. R. EVID. 706(a)
(subjecting experts appointed under FRE 706 to cross-examination and depositions), with Reilly
v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 157-58 (1st Cir. 1988) (declaring that technical advisors ap-
pointed under the inherent power are not subject to deposition or cross-examination). Finally, in
unusual circumstances, the Administrative Offices of the United States Courts may compensate
the technical advisor. See Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 1053-54.
244. See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 185 F.R.D. 192, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (reporting use of a
technical advisor to survey technical literature related to the drug Taxol); MediaCom, 4 F. Supp.
2d at 30 n.11 (explaining the judge's preference for a more inquisitorial approach when the ad-
versary system in ineffectual).
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been appointed to assist with complex medical issues,U5 technologi-
cal issues,24 and educational issues involving psychometrics. 247
These kinds of technical and scientific cases are good candidates for
technical advisor appointments, because they will likely involve
unusual, difficult, sophisticated, and complex problems.2 8
When judges decide to exercise their inherent power to ap-
point a technical advisor, the next step is for the judge to select an
expert and define that expert's role.249 As Daubert and other opin-
ions have suggested, 250 a technical advisor should not unduly dis-
rupt the normal adversarial process.2 1 Because the adversary sys-
tem attempts to promote judicial impartiality, personal autonomy,
and the search for the truth, concerns about these factors arise
when a non-adversarial technical advisor is employed.2 2 A judge
can ameliorate the personal autonomy concern by obtaining the
consent of the parties.253 Party consent to a technical advisor ap-
pointment also may suggest that the adversaries cannot effectively
uncover the truth and that judicial bias is unlikely.?5 If a party
consents ex ante to certain procedures or a technical advisor ap-
245. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Or. 1996) C'compli-
cated scientific and medical issues").
246. See Data Gen. Corp. v. IBM Corp., 93 F. Supp. 2d 89, 91 (D. Mass. 2000) (patent case);
TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (patent case); Hsu, 185
F.R.D. at 196 (trade secret case); MediaCom, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (patent case); Xilinx Inc. v.
Altera Corp., No. 93-20409 SW, 1997 WVL 581426, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 1997) (patent case).
247. See Ass'n of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 195 F.3d 465, 492 (9th Cir.
1999), afd on rehg, 231 F.3d 572, 590-91 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). "[P]sychometrics is the
measurement of psychological traits and characteristics." PAUL KLINE, THE NEW
PsYCHoMrRIcs: SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY AND MEASURFMENT 24 (1998). Psychometrics is a chal-
lenging subject area, in part, because psychological traits are not easily measured and quanti-
fied. Id. at 25. When some trait is purportedly measured, experts may not agree that the trait
has been measured in fact. Id. For example, it may be hard to prove that a test reliably meas-
ures personality or motivation. Id.
248. See Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 157 (1st Cir. 1988).
249. E.g., MediaCom, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30 (directing the parties to search for an appropri-
ate technical advisor or advisors); Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1392-1393 (recounting the judge's search
for technical advisors).
250. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 570, 596 (1993) (expressing confidence
in the adversary system); see Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999)
(noting that the trial judge's gatekeeper role is not meant to replace the adversary system); cf. La
Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957) (holding that a trial judge could not refer a
case to a special master if the reference would result in an abdication of the judicial function).
251. See, e.g., Reilly, 863 F.2d at 159-60; Hsu, 185 F.R.D. at 197; Mediaorm, 4 F. Supp. 2d at
29-30 & nil.
252. See discussion supra Part ILC.
253. Judges tend to initiate appointments on their own. Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at
1023. But, a court that initiates an appointment may still involve the parties in subsequent
proceedings.
254. Because the litigants will be directly affected by the outcome of the case, their consent
may ratify a deviation from adversarial procedures.
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pointment, appellate courts are unlikely to permit an ex post chal-
lenge to the procedure or appointment. 55 Whether the parties con-
sent or not, some judges try to involve the parties in the selection
process. 256 Parties are asked to help select an expert or to raise ob-
jections to court-selected experts. 257 Thus, the parties take a role in
educating the judge and in presenting competing visions of good
experts. 258 This involvement preserves some party autonomy and
should lessen fears of judicial impartiality and impairment of the
truth-finding process.
Party consent and involvement in the selection process are
not necessary.259 Without party involvement, the judge must "go it
alone. ' 260 Judges have searched for technical advisors by contacting
university faculty,2 6 ' other professionals, 262  and research
institutes.263 The search for a competent, unbiased, and disinter-
ested expert can be time consuming without assistance.264 In Reilly,
the district judge inquired of three faculty members before finding
an expert who had no direct contact with the case.2 65 In Hall, the
district judge enlisted a doctor to help him screen and select four
technical advisors. 266 Read together, Hall and Reilly lend credence
255. Ass'n of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 195 F.3d 492, 465 (9th Cir. 1999)
(noting that appellant failed to object even though the district court gave the parties an opportu-
nity to do so), affd on reh'g, 231 F.3d 572, 590-91 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Reilly, 863 F.2d at
160 & n.9 (holding that a party waived its right to procedural safeguards when it "sat back and
knowingly acquiesced in the cours unconditional hiring of an unidentified technical advisor').
256. Hsu, 185 F.R.D. at 197 (consulting the parties regarding the selection of a technical ad-
visor); MediaCom, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30 & n.11 (preferring party involvement, but indicating a
willingness to "go it alone").
257. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 159-60; Hsu, 185 F.R.D. at 197; MediaCom, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30.
258. Cf JAMES ET AL., supra note 13, § 1.2 (explaining that allowing parties to present thoir
own cases secures their role in the adjudication process).
259. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392-93 (D. Or. 1996) (submitting
party questions to technical advisors, but not requiring the advisors to answer those questions);
MediaCom, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 30 n.11 (expressing judge's willingness to proceed without party
involvement). But see Reilly, 863 F.2d at 159 (suggesting that parties be notified of the court's
intent to appoint a technical advisor).
260. MediaCom, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 30 & n.11.
261. Reilly v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 150, 152-53 (D.R.I. 1988) (Brown University and
University of Rhode Island).
262. See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1393 (employing a M.D./Ph.D to assist in screening and se-
lecting advisors).
263. See Ass'n of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 195 F.3d 465, 492 (9th Cir.
1999) (RAND Corporation), withdrawn, 208 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hsu, 185
F.R.D. 192, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (National Cancer Institute).
264. When the process involves the parties, the burden of finding and screening exports is
divided between the judge and the parties. See Hsu, 185 F.R.D. at 197; MediaCom, 4 F. Supp. 2d
at 29-30.
265. Reilly, 682 F. Supp. at 152-53.
266. Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1393.
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to the theory that judges who know members of the scientific com-
munity may appoint experts more often because the burden of
finding a suitable expert is lessened for these judges. 26
Judicial reluctance to intrude upon the adversary system
and the practical burdens associated with facilitating an appoint-
ment apparently have kept appointments rare. Recent opinions,
however, suggest that judges are becoming more receptive to the
use of technical advisors. 26 These opinions justify technical advisor
appointments not on the sole ground that the adversary system had
failed, but rather on the alternate ground that appointing a techni-
cal advisor was consistent with good judging.269 These judges point
to Justice Breyer's concurrence in Joiner as support for this propo-
sition2 70 and may depict technical advisors as specialized law clerks
rather than overbearing tutors.271 The Court Appointed Scientific
267. See supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text.
268. See Mexican-American Educators, 195 F.3d at 492; Hsu, 185 F.R.D. at 196-97; Media-
Corn, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 29; see also Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1310-11 (11th
Cir. 1999); cf. MaryAnn Fenicato, $12 Million Patent Case Warrants Appointment of Court Tech-
nical Advisor and Jury Tutor, LAWYER'S J., June 16, 2000, at 1 (describing a state judge's ap-
pointment of a technical advisor). But see Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d 572, 611 (9th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Tashima, J., dissenting). In the first Mexican-American Educators opinion,
the court suggested that Justice Breyer's concurrence simply endorses technical advisors as
proposed in Reilly. Mexican-American Educators, 195 F.3d at 492; see also Mexican-American
Educators, 231 F.3d at 590-91. while it may be true that courts since Reilly have acknowledged
the trial judge's inherent power to appoint a technical advisor, recent opinions argue that the
power should be exercised more frequently in light of changed circumstances; most notably, the
opinions argue that trial judge's Daubert gatekeeper responsibility confers more latitude to ap-
point outside experts. See, e.g., Allison, 184 F.3d at 1311.
269. See Mexican-American Educators, 195 F.3d at 492; Hsu, 185 F.R.D. at 196-97; Media-
Corn, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 29.
270. See Mexican-American Educators, 195 F.3d at 492 (citing Justice Breyer's concurrence
in Joiner); MediaCom, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (same); see also Mexican-American Educators, 231
F.3d at 590.
271. See Mexican-American Educators, 195 F.3d at 493 & n.31 (likening a technical advisor
to a specialized law clerk); Hsu, 185 F.R.D. at 196-97 (using "scientific law clerk" and "technical
advisor" interchangeably). In the Reilly cases, the district court employed the law clerk analogy,
but the First Circuit did not. Compare Reilly v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.IJ.
1988) ('The expert becomes, in effect, a specialized law clerk."), with Reilly v. United States, 863
F.2d 149, 157-59 (1st Cir. 1988) (describing the role of the technical advisor without endorsing
the law clerk analogy). The law clerk analogy probably traces back to Judge Vyzanski's ap-
pointment of an economist as law clerk in United States t. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). See Carl Kaysen, In Mlemoriam: Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., 100 HARV.
L. REV. 713, 713-15 (1987) (reflections of the economist law clerk), cited in Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
One author has argued persuasively that the law clerk analogy is inapposite. Deason, supra
note 6, at 136-41. Accord Ass'n of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 609 (Tashima, J.,
dissenting); Choy, supra note 50, at 1444-45. Law clerks are an accepted institution because law
savvy judges are unlikely to defer to the typical law clerk-a recent law school graduate. Dea-
son, supra note 6, at 140. By contrast, judges resort to experts when their ovn experience is
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Experts ("CASE") project embodies this viewpoint, and, if the for-
mat gains widespread acceptance, it can be expected to increase the
number of technical advisor appointments. 272
IV. THE COURT APPOINTED SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS ("CASE")
PROJECT
In the fall of 1998, the American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science ("AAAS") launched a five-year demonstration
project, the Court Appointed Scientific Experts ("CASE") project,
designed to facilitate cooperation between judges and scientists. 273
CASE will help "district judges . . . obtain highly qualified, inde-
pendent scientists and engineers to serve as court-appointed ex-
perts."274 When a judge wants to appoint an expert under any
source of authority, the judge can call the CASE project. 275 Techni-
cal advisors are experts appointed under the judge's inherent
authority and, therefore, fall within the ambit of the project. 276
Project staff already will have identified and recruited qualified
experts willing to serve in just such a capacity. 277 Thus, when the
judge calls, CASE staff can recommend an expert tailored to the
specific request of the judge.278 This simple interaction leads a judge
to a qualified and unbiased expert. Project staff perform the more
complicated and time-consuming work.
The behind the scenes work is subdivided between commit-
tees. The CASE Project Advisory Committee oversees the project. 279
The Educational Subcommittee develops educational materials for
lacking. Id. at 141. Therefore, undue deference is a significantly greater risk when a judge con.
sults an expert in a non-legal field. Id.
272. See discussion infra Part V.
273. Runkle, supra note 9; Mark Hansen, Making a 'CASE'for Science, ABA JOURNAL, Oct.
1999, at 22. Justice Breyer called for this cooperative effort in Joiner quoting with approval an
amici proposal that the AAAS could recommend reputable experts to courts. Joiner, 522 U.S. at
149-50 (Breyer, J., concurring). The Leland Fikes Foundation and Open Society Institute fund
CASE. See Runkle, supra note 9. For other brief, in-print summaries of the project, see Hanson,
supra, at 22; Doug Bandow, Rule of Law: Keeping Junk Science Out of the Courtroom, WALL ST.
J., July 26, 1999, at A23. For online information about the project, see Court Appointed Scien-
tific Experts: A Demonstration Project of the AAAS, at http://www.aaas.orglspp/case/case.htm.
274. See Runkle, supra note 9
275. Id.
276. Id. (quoting Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Joiner as support for the CASE proj-
ect); see also Hansen, supra note 273, at 22 (reporting that a CASE expert "could be called upon
to do everything from providing technical advice to the judge to testifying before a jury").
277. See Hansen, supra note 273, at 22.
278. Id.
279. See Runkle, supra note 9.
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experts and judges. 280 Material prepared for experts describes the
adversarial process and the role of an appointed expert.28 1 Material
prepared for judges describes procedures and suggests helpful in-
formation for managing pretrial and trial proceedings. 28 2 The Pro-
fessional Standards Subcommittee drafts questionnaires to gather
pertinent information and guidelines governing conflicts of
interest.283 The Evaluation Subcommittee coordinates CASE's com-
pliance with the evaluation plans of the Federal Judicial Center. 2 4
Finally, the Recruitment and Screening Panel searches for willing
experts who are capable of communicating highly technical infor-
mation to non-scientific audiences. 8 All of this preparatory work
significantly decreases the judicial investment of time and re-
sources needed to appoint an expert.
More generally, CASE puts a stamp of approval on the use of
court-appointed experts in the adversarial process. Before recom-
mending an expert, the project evaluates the expert on several lev-
els: general suitability for the role; compatibility with the judge;
and impartiality in the specific case.286 The project specifically edu-
cates chosen experts regarding the adversarial process.287 Thus, the
judge knows that the expert chosen via CASE is probably well
suited for the job. Prestigious affiliations also validate the project.
The sponsoring organization, the AAAS, is one of the largest inter-
national collections of scientists.2m Ninth Circuit Judge Pamela
Ann Rymer chairs the Advisory Committee.2 9 Justice Breyer and
the United States House of Representatives Science Committee
have endorsed the project. 290 When judges have misgivings about
280. See id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Bandow, supra note 273, at A23. AAAS has 282 affiliated societies and 144,000 mem-
bers. Id.
289. Runkle, supra note 9. District Judges Martin Feldman and Louis Pollak are also mem-
bers of the Advisory Committee. Id.
290. See UNLOCKING, supra note 8 (stating "[e]fforts designed to identify highly qualified and
impartial scientific experts to provide advice to the courts for scientific and technical decisions
must be encouraged" and endorsing AAAS's demonstration project specifically); Breyer, supra
note 165, at 7-8; Breyer, supra note 162 (endorsing AAASs court-appointed expert project as a
"promising method[] to help bring science and law closer together").
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the propriety of an expert appointment, 291 these endorsements tend
to dispel those doubts.
V. CURRENT LIMITS ON THE INHERENT POWER TO APPOINT
TECHNICAL ADVISORS
This Note predicts that cooperative efforts like CASE will in-
crease the frequency of technical advisor appointments because the
project and its adherents take aim at two factors that previously
checked judicial desire to make appointments: judicial deference to
the adversary system and the administrative burdens associated
with initiating an appointment and selecting an expert. Increased
use of technical advisors may be good or bad; commentators fall on
both sides of the issue. 29 2 But if the power is exercised more fre-
quently, this Note argues a balance should be struck to preserve the
role of the adversaries. Limits can give judges guidance in deter-
mining the proper balance. 293 Normally, in the adversary system,
parties are responsible for case development. 294 Daubert suggests
that the adversaries should not be displaced merely because a case
involves a technical subject matter,295 and, if a judge does resort to
a third party technical advisor, the parties should be involved to the
extent possible. I
In every circuit except the First Circuit, the trial judge's
power to appoint a technical advisor is not practically limited. Ap-
pointments are reviewed only for abuse of discretion, 296 a very leni-
ent standard of appellate review. 297 The standard is even less con-
291. Cf Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 1018 (finding judges preferred not to appoint an
expert under FRE 706 unless the adversary system failed).
292. Compare, e.g., Deason, supra note 6, at 153 (conceding that technical advisors may help
a judge understand technical issues, but arguing that the advantage is offset when adversarial
procedures are forsaken), with Jackson, supra note 6, at 464-65 (arguing that technical advisors
are the most practical solution to many of the problems judges face in scientific cases). Increased
certainty might increase judicial willingness to appoint technical advisors, but limits could also
ensure appointments promote the goals of the adversary system.
293. Cf. Deason, supra note 6, at 142 (arguing that "more carefully defined appointment
standards and procedures are needed" if FRE 706 is used more frequently); Todd D. Peterson,
Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 41, 84 (1995) (contending that new checks should be devised to curb judges' managerial
power).
294. See discussion supra Part 1.C.
295. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
296. See Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 157, 159-60 (1st Cir. 1988).
297. See MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND
PRACTICE § 5.06 (3d ed. 1999). Numerous trial decisions are committed to the trial judge's dis-
cretion. Id. Appellate courts will reverse the trial judge's decision on these matters only if the
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fining when considered in light of the "nebulous and shadowy" in-
herent power.298 The only definite limit on the exercise of the power
is Article III, that forbids abandoning the judicial function to non-
Article III actors.299 To cure this vagueness, the Reilly court articu-
lated procedural safeguards curbing the trial judge's discretion and
declared that omitting one of the safeguards might constitute an
abuse of discretion. 30 Coupling abuse of discretion review with the
Reilly procedural safeguards provides a clearer standard for appel-
late review.30 1 Furthermore, the Reilly safeguards preserve the ad-
versaries' role in the process thus providing a check on the power of
the trial judge.30 2 Slightly more rigorous appellate review and party
involvement are non-intrusive checks on the trial judge's power
that ensure judges are using technical advisors to supplement and
not supplant the adversary system. Reilly, however, is the law only
in the First Circuit.3 03
Procedures implemented in and outside the First Circuit re-
flect the positive potential of Reilly-type safeguards. In MediaCom
Corp. v. Rates Technology, Inc., a case arising in a First Circuit dis-
trict, the district court employed procedures that reflected respect
for the adversary system and party autonomy. 3°0 The judge thought
the case was well suited to the use of a technical advisor and indi-
cated that he intended to use one.305 The judge's first choice was to
involve the parties in the process.305 The district judge gave the par-
ties thirty days to agree upon an advisor.307 If the parties could not
agree on a single expert, the parties were given an extra fifteen
days to agree upon three experts with knowledge generally reflect-
judge abused his or her discretion. Id. This standard almost always results in upholding the
trial judge's decision. Id.
298. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985).
299. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 157-58; see also discussion Part. II.B.
300. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 160 (stating that the court would "not hesitate to reverse if proce.
dural safeguards were wholly inadequate").
301. Id. at 159-60.
302. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
303. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 159-60; see also Jackson, supra note 6, at 448.49 (advocating a less
conservative approach to technical advisor appointments and noting Reilly only controls in the
First Circuit). While no other circuit has explicitly adopted all of the procedural safeguards
suggested in Reilly, they have cited Reilly approvingly. See Ass'n of Mexican-American Educa-
tors v. California, 195 F.3d 465, 493 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn, 208 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2000);
Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 972 F.2d 304, 308 n.8 (10th Cir. 1992).
304. MediaCom Corp. v. Rates Tech. Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 17, 29-30 (D. Mass. 1998).
305. See id. at 30 & n.11. The judge ordered the parties to equally share payment for the
technical advisor. Id. at 29-30.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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ing the range of views about the technical subject matter. 30 8 If the
parties could not agree at all, the court required a detailed report of
their reasons. 309 In the event the adversaries did not reach an
agreement, the court was willing to "go it alone."310
In a case outside the First Circuit, Hall v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., the court also involved the parties in the process, but to a
lesser degree.31' The district judge decided to invoke the court's in-
herent power to appoint independent advisors.3 12 The court then
enlisted a doctor to assist in its search for experts in the fields of
epidemiology, immunology/toxicology, rheumatology, and chemis-
try.3 13 The court appointed four technical advisors to assist in de-
ciding admissibility of certain expert testimony.3 14 In a four-day
hearing, the court, the parties, and the technical advisors ques-
tioned the parties' experts.3 15 The court and technical advisors also
viewed the parties' video taped summations. 31 6 Finally, the court
submitted its questions and the parties' proposed questions to the
308. Id. at 30.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 30 n.11. The court predicted that failure to agree would be a result of "partisan-
ship run amok." Id. at 30. The court also said it preferred a technical advisor to "the clash of
adversary presentations." Id. at 30 n.11. With these statements, the court seems concerned with
the adversary system failing commonly called "the battle of the experts." See supra note 105.
311. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392-93 (D. Or. 1996) (Jones, J.);
see also Jane F. Thorpe et al., Court-Appointed Experts and Technical Advisors, 26 LITI, 31, 33-
34 (2000) (recounting portions of an interview with Judge Jones).
312. Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1392.
313. Id. at 1392-93.
314. Id. The judge invoked his inherent authority and appointed the technical advisors un-
der FRE 104, rather than FRE 706. Id. at 1392 & n.8. FRE 104(a) provides that most of the
evidence rules, presumably including FRE 706, are not binding when determining admissibility.
FED. R. EVID. 104(a) & advisory committee's note. The rationale for citing FRE 104 is unclear.
FRE 104 does not speak to expert appointments specifically, and, on its face, does not appear to
be an independent grant of power to appoint experts. The judge noted that he appointed the
technical advisors under FRE 104 instead of FRE 706, "[t]o keep the advisors independent of any
ongoing proceedings." Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1392 n.8; see also Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184
F.3d 1300, 1311 nn.10-11 (11th Cir. 1999) (approving of the Hall courts FRE 104 appointments).
The judge's stated goal was to avoid the procedural requirements of FRE 706. Hall, 947 F. Supp.
at 1392 n.8. But, a technical advisor whose appointment is based on the judge's inherent power
is not subject to FRE 706. See Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding
that FRE 706 encompasses only court-appointed expert witnesses and not technical advisors).
One explanation is that the judge thought the advisors might exceed the limited role of a techni.
cal advisor and cited FRE 104 as a justification for increased flexibilit) in admissibility hearings.
See infra notes 327-29 and accompanying text. Alternately, the judge may have cited FRE 104 to
illustrate that the advisors were merely commenting on proposed evidence and were not provid-
ing independent evidence as expert witnesses appointed under FRE ',-)6 might. Cf. Reilly, 863
F.2d at 156 (reasoning that FRE 706 does not apply to technical advisors because they do not
contribute new evidence to the trial).
315. Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1393.
316. Id.
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technical advisors, but told the advisors they did not have to an-
swer the parties' questions. 317 The technical advisors filed reports to
conclude their role.318 The court gave copies of the reports to the
parties and afforded the parties an opportunity to question the re-
port and lodge objections.319
As expected, the district court in MediaCom adhered more
closely to Reilly than the district court in Hall. The MediaCom
judge notified the parties that he intended to appoint a technical
advisor and cited the parties to an appendix for a job description.320
Since the advisor had not yet been appointed, the other safeguards
were inapplicable.321 More generally, the judge minimized the dis-
ruption to the adversarial process by giving the parties the chance
to agree on an expert. 322 As to Hall, it can be argued that the court
followed the spirit, if not the letter, of Reilly.3? The parties knew
the judge was using technical advisors, and the parties were kept
abreast of court communications with the advisors.32 4 The Hall
technical advisors filed written reports that the Reilly court stated
were not necessary. 32 The judge involved the parties in the process
somewhat. The adversaries helped develop the issues presented to
the technical advisors and could contest the findings of the techni-
cal advisors.326 On the other hand, the Hall court did not cite
Reilly.327 Apparently, the judge did not create a written job descrip-
tion, nor did he require the technical advisors to swear compliance
with the job description.3 The Hall court apparently gave the par-
ties no role in the advisor selection process. 32
This comparison of Hall and MediaCom indicates that, while
Reilly may have influence, courts outside of the First Circuit are
not persuaded to follow the strictures of Reilly.330 Thus, in most ju-
317. Id. at 1393-94.
318. Id. at 1394.
319. Id.
320. MediaCom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc. 4 F. Supp. 2d 17,29-30 (D. Mass. 1998).
321. Specifically, non-existent communications between the court and advisor could not be
recorded. See Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 158 (1st Cir. 1988). Nor could the technical
advisor swear that he had performed in the proper capacity. See id. at 169-60.
322. MedjaCom, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30.
323. Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1392-94.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1394. See also Reilly, 863 F.2d at 160 n.8.
326. Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1394.
327. Id. at 1392-94.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Compare i& (eschewing Reilly implicitly), with MediaCom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4
F. Supp. 2d 17, 29-30 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing Reilly and complying with the applicable Reilly
safeguards).
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risdictions, general appellate review for abuse of discretion is the
only check on a district judge's decision to appoint an advisor. If
cooperative efforts like CASE increase the frequency of technical
advisor appointments, opportunities for abuse of these appoint-
ments in the other circuits will also increase. While a certain de-
gree of experimentation and flexibility are probably desirable,881
limits are also necessary to guide judicial experimentation in a di-
rection that is compatible with the adversary system.8 2
VI. MORE EFFECTIVE LIMITS ON THE INHERENT POWER TO
APPOINT TECHNICAL ADVISORS
Since the efficacy of mere abuse of discretion review is doubt-
ful,338 greater checks and limits are needed to guide the develop-
ment of technical advisor jurisprudence. Such checks and limits
should minimize the disruption to the adversarial process while
preserving the flexible "sounding board" role of technical
advisors.8 4 The remainder of this Note suggests three possible
checks or limits on trial judges' inherent power to appoint technical
advisors. First, appellate courts could require Reilly-type proce-
dural safeguards to ensure fundamental fairness. Second, a rule
like FRE 706 or FRCP 53(b) could be enacted to standardize techni-
cal advisor procedure. Third, trial judges may exercise prudential
self-restraint and appoint technical advisors in a conservative
manner giving due deference to the adversary system.
A. Procedural Safeguards as a Constitutional Requirement
The Reilly court agreed with the appellant's claim that fun-
damental fairness requires district courts to adhere to certain pro-
cedural safeguards when appointing a technical advisor.88 5 Because
fundamental fairness is the hallmark of due process, 3 6 the Reilly
331. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 150 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
332. Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
333. See TIGAR & TIGAR, supra note 297, § 5.06.
334. Cf. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (expressing confidence in the adversary system); Reilly v.
United States, 863 F.2d 149, 156-60 (1st Cir. 1988) (defining the role of the technical advisor and
procedural safeguards that are consistent with that role).
335. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 159 (acknowledging merit in appellant's argument that fundamental
fairness required procedural safeguards). For a somewhat different perspective regarding desir-
able safeguards, see supra note 213.
336. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1980) (equating due process
and fundamental fairness); cf. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (stating in an
inherent power to sanction case that a "court must.., exercise caution in invoking its inherent
power, and it must comply with the mandates of due process").
[Vol. 54:2:547586
2001] JUDGES COOPERATING WITH SCIENTISTS
court arguably believed that due process requires procedural safe-
guards.337 Thus, the United States Constitution 33 may require an
appellate court in any jurisdiction to consider whether a judge who
appoints a technical advisor without employing procedural safe-
guards violates due process. 339
B. Statutory Limit
Like court-appointed testifying experts, technical advisors
could be addressed under a Federal Rule. 340 A technical advisor rule
should defer to the adversary system when possible, but also give
courts latitude to go outside the system when it completely fails.341
The rule should preserve the flexible role for the technical advisor
envisioned in Reilly.3 42 Another concern is that judges might ap-
point persons as technical advisors when they are actually func-
tioning as expert witnesses to escape the stricter requirements of
FRE 706. Therefore, the rule should respect the boundaries of FRE
706.
The following proposed rule is modeled on FRE 706 and
might be enacted as Federal Rule of Evidence 707: Court Appointed
Technical Advisors.
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to
show cause why a technical advisor should not be appointed, and may request the
parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any technical advisor
agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint a technical advisor of its own selec-
tion. The court shall not appoint a technical advisor unless the advisor consents to
act. A technical advisor so appointed shall be informed of the technical advisor's
duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a
conference in which the parties shall have an opportunity to participate. In the ex-
ercise of the coures discretion, the court may consult a technical advisor ex parte.
Unless the court provides otherwise, the technical advisor shall not be available to
the parties. Technical advisors shall be compensated in the same manner as expert
witnesses under FRE 706(b). If the expert provides evidence as contemplated un-
der FRE 706(a), the provisions of FRE 706 must be satisfied.
337. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 159 (stating that there is merit in notion requiring fundamental fair-
ness).
338. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ('No person.., shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 C Nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
339. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 159. This right would be subject to waiver. Id. at 160. A party who
does not object at the time of appointment or when procedures are implemented may be held to
have waived the due process right to procedural safeguards. Id.
340. See FED. P. EvID. 706 (court-appointed expert witnesses).
341. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 156-57, 159-60; see also discussion supra Parts IIA, II.C.
342. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 157-58 (defining the role of a technical advisor).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The first two sentences provide for initiation of the appoint-
ment process and selection of the technical advisor.3 43 The Rule is
worded to encourage party involvement. Parties may request a
technical advisor appointment, and the court may solicit nomina-
tions from the parties. Ultimate authority to appoint a technical
advisor and to select a particular technical advisor rest in the trial
judge's discretion. The third sentence prevents the court from com-
pelling an expert to serve as a technical advisor. 44 The fourth sen-
tence requires that the parties be made aware of the expected role
of the technical advisor. 45 This requirement gives the parties a
chance to voice concerns and objections, and facilitates party in-
volvement and appellate review. The fifth sentence leaves ex parte
communication with the technical advisor in the court's
discretion.3 46 This reservation should protect the "sounding board"
role of the technical advisor. 47 The sixth sentence establishes that,
by default, the parties will not be able to examine, depose, or ask
questions of the technical advisor. Affirmative action by the court is
required to make the technical advisor available to the parties. This
requirement is also meant to protect the role of the technical advi-
sor. Compensation of technical advisors is a difficult subject, and
the seventh sentence provides that technical advisors may be com-
pensated in the same manner as expert witnesses under FRE
706.38 The eighth and final sentence provides that when an ap-
pointee provides evidence, rather than merely commenting on evi-
dence from other sources, FRE 706 applies. 349
C. Prudential Self-Restraint
The last proposed safeguard is for trial judges to exercise
self-restraint. Judges in the past have highly esteemed the adver-
sary system and have been reluctant to forsake it.350 In the absence
of limits on the inherent power to appoint technical advisors, trial
343. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
344. Cf id.
345. Cf id.
346. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 160 n.8 (observing that the "the judge and the advisor [should] be
able to communicate informally, in a frank and open fashion"). But see Ass'n of Mexican.
American Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 613-14 (9th Cir. 2000) (Tashima, J., dissenting).
347. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 157 (characterizing a technical advisor as sounding board for the
court).
348. See Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 1053-54. For the text of FRE 706(b), see supra
note 78.
349. FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
350. Cecil & Willging, supra note 2, at 1018.
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judges should continue this practice. Adversarial values and Ameri-
can notions of a limited judiciary suggest that the parties should be
responsible for case development. 31 The use of court adjuncts iso-
lated from adversarial procedures shifts responsibility away from
the parties.3 52 While some cases demand a more inquisitorial ap-
proach, American courts do not favor the attendant concentration of
power.3 53 Even though cooperative efforts like CASE endorse the
use of outside experts and provide a simplified selection mecha-
nism, 354 district court judges should recognize the opportunity for
unintended abuse and exercise self-restraint in the absence of other
formal legal constraints.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the American adversary system, federal trial judges faced
with complex scientific and technical issues usually rely on the ad-
versaries to educate and inform them. When circumstances require,
judges may depart from traditional adversarial procedures and em-
ploy outside assistance. Technical advisors appointed under the
judge's inherent power are one option.
Limits on the judge's inherent power to appoint a technical
advisor are few outside of the First Circuit. Abuses of this power
have been rare, however, because judges have exercised the power
rarely. This Note argues that judges rarely exercised this power in
part due to respect for the adversary system and the administrative
burden of finding a qualified technical advisor.
Cooperative efforts between scientists and judges may un-
dercut both of these barriers to technical advisor appointments. For
example, CASE minimizes the effort required of a judge seeking to
make an appointment and provides a general endorsement of out-
side assistance. Propelled by Justice Breyer's concurrence in Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Joiner, a cooperative effort like CASE is poised
to bring science into the courtroom with increasing frequency. Such
collaboration between scientists and lawyers may be ultimately
beneficial, but the frequent exercise of a nebulous power poses
problems.
351. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) "'These conven-
tional [adversarial] devices, rather than wholesale exclusion .. , are the appropriate safeguards
.... "); see also discussion supra Parts ILA, H.C.
352. See discussion supra Part H.C.
353. See supra note 42.
354. See discussion supra Part IV.
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Without defined checks and limits on the inherent power to
appoint technical advisors, adversarial procedures may be forsaken
too easily. New limits are needed to promote the growth of technical
advisor jurisprudence in a direction that is consistent with the
overarching goals of the adversary system. The procedural safe-
guards set forth in Reilly v. United States meet this criterion. This
Note proposes adoption of similar procedural safeguards in all ju-
risdictions, a new Federal Rule of Evidence, or prudential self-
restraint by trial judges as limits that could help provide for orderly
development of technical advisor law.
Robert L. Hess Ir
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